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REAL RESPECT: A REJECTION OF RICHARD MILLER’S
PATRIOTIC BIAS IN TAX-FINANCED AID
Gerbrand Hoogvliet
Abstract This paper analyzes Richard W. Miller's argument for
favoring compatriots in the allocation of tax-financed aid. It argues
that Miller‘s patriotic bias is derived via an incorrect framing of
the problem. It furthermore contends that Miller‘s notion of equal
respect is too uninformative to ground such a patriotic bias. A
better definition of respect in terms of human rights is offered. This
definition is more informative but fails to uphold the stringent bias
Miller argues for.
National borders occupy a curious position in political
philosophy and ethics. Their existence and location is often the
result of mere historical accident. Yet, despite this arbitrary nature,
the nation states defined by these borders are often chosen as the
primary actors in theories of international relations. Similarly in
ethics, there is a tension between the fact that citizenship seems
morally arbitrary, insofar as it is usually bestowed upon persons at
birth, and on the other hand the moral obligations that participation
in a particular society seem to give rise to. In the context of global
poverty national borders take on another moral dimension since
they often, as Michael Blake puts it, ―divide not simply one
jurisdiction from another, but the rich from the poor as well‖1.
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Given the grim facts of poverty in many parts of the world, the
question of whether wealthier nations are morally allowed to favor
their own citizens over foreigners in dire need becomes an
important one.
Richard Miller, in his contribution to the anthology The
Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, entitled ―Cosmopolitan
Respect and Patriotic Concern‖, provides a universalist defense of
such a favoritism. He argues that on the basis of the principle of
equal respect for all persons we are in fact obligated to prioritize
our compatriots when it comes to tax-financed aid. He argues that
a violation of such a patriotic bias would entail disrespectful
treatment of our fellow citizens and would lead to an excessive
loss of social trust. Given that breaking the principle of equal
respect is wrong, violation of the patriotic bias is also wrong. We
are thus morally obligated to prioritize compatriots in the
administration of such aid.
In this paper I will argue against the position put forward
by Richard Miller. I will begin with an exposition of his argument.
For the benefit of the reader I will also provide a brief explanation
of concepts found in John Rawls‘s Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement, that are important to a proper understanding of
Miller‘s position. I will then provide my own critique, focusing
firstly on what I hold to be an improper framing of the issue,
followed by a more fundamental criticism of the notion of equal
respect used by Miller. I will show his definition of equal respect
to be uninformative and anemic and will proceed to redefine this
concept in a more substantial way by appealing to the
philosophical literature on human rights.
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Miller
In his paper, Miller aims to provide ―a universalist
justification of the patriotic bias in aid.‖2 Universalism here refers
to a position similar to cosmopolitanism, which takes human
beings as ‗the relevant unit of moral concern‘. It is mainly defined
in contrast to what Miller calls particularism, which is a view
maintained by philosophers such as David Miller and Michael
Sandel, who ascribe intrinsic value to communities of persons such
as nations. For particularists, the defense of patriotism is usually
based on some notion that it benefits the community or the nation
state. Since Richard Miller rejects a view of nations as intrinsically
valuable he cannot make a similar claim. In fact, because he adopts
the universalist view of all persons as having equal moral value, he
commits himself to the use of universal principle that applies to all
persons. This principle is that of equal respect.
In order to establish a patriotic bias, however, he first has to
identify what such a bias consists of. He points out that the
patriotic bias is really a combination of two biases: an attention
bias and a budgetary bias. To establish the attention bias he has to
prove that we are justified and indeed obligated to pay more
attention to the needs of our compatriots than to the needs of
foreigners. The budgetary bias is then the working out of this
attention bias in terms of assigning aid and simply means that the
majority of our tax-financed aid is indeed spent on compatriots. He
recognizes that he has to establish the attention bias before he can
claim the budgetary bias.
2
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Equal Respect
In establishing the principle of equal respect, Miller makes
an appropriate distinction between respect and concern. Whereas
most of the literature conflates these two terms, he defines them
separately. Concern, for Miller, applies to personal relationships
such as between family members, friends etc and signifies a deep
level of caring for the well being of others. I think Miller rightly
restricts this type of sympathy to those who we are personally
acquainted with. As an example, he states that although he owes
equal respect to his daughter and the girl across the street, he is not
required to have the same level of concern for the latter. I think this
is a sensible distinction and it clarifies the task at hand: since
concern covers all persons that we stand in a personal relationship
to, the principle of respect is the one that will regulate our behavior
to strangers domestically and abroad.
The equal respect that we owe to strangers has two main
parameters:
1) One avoids moral wrongness just in case one
conforms to some set of rules for living by
which one could express equal respect for all.3
2) A choice is wrong just in case it violates every
set of shared rules of conduct to which
everyone could be freely and rationally
committed without anyone‘s violating his or
her own self-respect.4
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The phrasing of these parameters is somewhat confusing, but in a
nutshell they provide two conditions under which equal respect is
violated. Under the first rule, it is morally wrong to choose a
method of administering tax-financed aid that does not show equal
respect for all. The second parameter claims that it is wrong to
choose a way of distributing aid in a way that some persons could
not self-respectfully accept. To use an example, if you and I were
to start a lawn mowing business and I suggested that, even though
we put in the same amount of work, I should get all the money,
then that would not be an arrangement that you could selfrespectfully accept.
Miller thus separates respect out into a respect outward and
respect inward; respect for others and self-respect. Any
administration of tax financed aid thus has to express and satisfy
both forms of respect.
Rawlsian Intermezzo
At this point I think it will be beneficial to elucidate some
concepts from John Rawls that are implicit in much of Miller‘s
further discussion. Although Miller is not defending anything like
a Rawlsian position, much of political philosophy is steeped in the
tradition started by Rawls and it is therefore useful to have a basic
understanding of some of the background concepts informing this
discussion.
Rawls conceives of society as ―a fair system of
cooperation‖5 among free and equal citizens. Fairness is necessary
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for Rawls because one does not choose what society one is born
into, and exiting a society is extremely difficult if not impossible.
Society is thus unlike other forms of association such as local
communities, schools, clubs, church congregations etc. where
membership can be given up if one is asked to uphold rules and
practices that one is unwilling to support. Since no such an exit
option exists for the nation state there is a more urgent demand for
fairness.
Not only is societal membership largely involuntary, it also
exposes persons to the coercive nature of the state. For Rawls
―political power is always coercive power applied by the state and
its apparatus of enforcement.‖ 6 As citizens we participate in the
creation of laws, which the state then enforces in our name.
Justification is thus demanded both on the grounds that laws are
enacted in our name as well as that laws are enforced upon us.
Given this nature of society and the demands for
justification that it gives rise to, Rawls is particularly concerned
with the well being of what he calls ―the least-advantaged
members of society.‖7 It is easy to see why this is: given the
coercive nature of the state and the near impossibility of exiting
society, it is the worst off group that is most likely to feel trapped
in a system that they would not voluntarily uphold. This group
could certainly be coerced into cooperation, but the ideal of a just
society would then have been forfeited. I take Miller‘s concerns
about respect to also be focusing largely on this group, and for
similar reasons.

6
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Loss of Social Trust
Returning to Miller‘s argument, he claims that a failure to
prioritize compatriots would entail a violation of the principle of
equal respect. This violation comes about in two ways. First,
without a patriotic bias, tax-financed aid is distributed in a way that
does not express respect to all. Specifically, the least-advantaged
members of society are not treated respectfully by their fellow
citizens. This goes against the first parameter of equal respect that I
stated above. The idea here seems to be that by not paying extra
attention to the needs of disadvantaged compatriots we are treating
them disrespectfully, which the first parameter holds to be wrong.
The second way in which a breach of equal respect comes
about is through the inability of the least-advantaged group in
society to self-respectfully accept such an allocation of taxfinanced aid. Put differently, the least well off members of society
could not choose a use of tax-financed aid that did not prioritize
them and at the same time maintain their self-respect. The sacrifice
required of them would be too large, the inequalities faced too
stark. Since an allocation is imposed on them that they could not
self-respectfully accept, parameter 2 of equal respect is violated
and the allocation is thus wrong.
It is important to note here that the priority that Miller
requires is a very strong one:
[P]riority does not totally exclude support for
foreign aid in the presence of relevant domestic
burdens. Still, until domestic political
arrangements have done as much as they can [...]
to eliminate serious burdens of domestic
inequality of life-prospects, there should be no
7

significant sacrifice of this goal in order to help
disadvantaged foreigners.8
To put the consequences of this patriotic bias in context, Miller
presents us with three persons who present the three main
stakeholders in the outcome of this discussion. Kevin is a corporate
lawyer living in a rich suburb of New York. Carla lives in the
South Bronx and earns a meager living cleaning other people‘s
apartments. Khalid, finally, collects scrap metal and lives in a slum
in Dacca, Bangladesh. Miller maintains that the patriotic bias and
its consequences can be self-respectfully accepted by all three. As
we stated above, Carla, as a member of the least-advantaged group
in society, can self-respectfully accept a situation in which she is
prioritized to the extent that Miller suggests in the statement above.
Kevin also upholds the principle of equal respect since he is
treating Carla in a respectful manner. Khalid, according to Miller,
can also self-respectfully accept the patriotic bias that Kevin and
Carla adhere to since he understands that both value the social trust
that would be lost without such a bias. Kevin and Carla are also
assumed to be treating Khalid respectfully, although Miller does
not go into detail as to why that would be the case.
Naturally such a bias is a very convenient view for rich
societies to hold since it reduces their obligations to foreign aid
significantly. As Thomas Nagel points out in ―The Problem of
Global Justice‖, however, the fact that a theory is convenient
doesn‘t make it false.9
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There is, however, another reason to be suspicious about
Miller‘s patriotic bias as based on the principle of equal respect.
Note that changes in Khalid‘s level of deprivation do not change
the bias. Miller chooses to think of him as a scrap metal collector
in Bangladesh, but we could just as easily imagine him as living in
a refugee camp in Chad, or working 70 hours a week in a coal
mine in Brazil, and Miller‘s bias would remain unaffected. Also
note that Khalid does not feature anywhere in Miller‘s argument
prior to the establishment of the patriotic bias. The fact that
Khalid‘s circumstances are not being taken into account at all
makes it at the very least unlikely that he is being shown equal
respect.
Deciding on the extent of a patriotic bias that is supposed to
show equal respect to all can hardly be done without looking at the
needs of foreigners, especially given the severity of global poverty.
Although the facts of global poverty cannot, in and of themselves,
decide the debate about patriotic bias, they can help pull it into
focus. Thomas Pogge estimates that in the 15 years following the
Cold War, 270 million people died from poverty related causes, an
average of 18 million a year.10 Against the backdrop of these grim
facts, a theory that does not take into account the needs of the
global poor can hardly claim to express equal respect for all.
In the next section I will present two criticisms of Miller‘s
argument. The first focuses on a framing issue that I think skews
the debate and misrepresents the trade-offs involved in reallocation
10
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of tax-financed aid. The second criticism is far more fundamental
and proves that the principle of equal respect used by Miller is
uninformative and stands in need of a better definition. I will
consequently suggest a more informative definition grounded in
contemporary political philosophy of human rights.
Framing
My claim here is that Miller gets the strong bias that he
wants by the way he frames the reallocation of tax-financed aid. In
short, my contention is that Miller implicit assumes the amount of
tax-financed aid to be fixed, or determined at a point prior to the
patriotic bias discussion. By doing this, any imagined change to the
allocation of this aid becomes a zero-sum game between Carla and
Khalid. The amount of aid is set, so any aid to Khalid will have to
come out of tax money reserved for Carla. This places undue
tension on the allocation decision as we are forced to choose
between two persons clearly in need. Certainly, in absolute terms
Khalid is worse off than Carla, but on the other hand Carla is
forced to participate in a society with people like Kevin, which
raises concerns of fairness domestically. The radically unequal
income distribution in the United States only further aids Miller‘s
argument.
My point is that this is an incorrect framing of the question.
If we are really concerned with equal respect for all, we should not
take tax aid as given, but rather as a function of the needs of Carla
and Khalid and what is owed to them on account of this respect. If,
for the sake of argument, we take Kevin as the sole tax payer, then
the tax rate imposed on him should be set at a level at which both
Carla and Khalid can self-respectfully accept the amount of aid
10

they receive. Framing the question in this way, I think Miller may
still be justified in claiming that more is owed to compatriots on
account of the coercive nature of the state. However, the amount
owed to Khalid is likely to be much higher than what he has in
mind. Thinking about the reallocation of aid in this way also makes
more sense if we view it from Khalid‘s perspective. He is more
likely to think of himself as being owed some type of aid by Kevin
rather than by Carla, since Kevin is in a position to improve
Khalid‘s life significantly, at little cost to himself.
This then raises the question of how much domestic and
foreign aid would be sufficient for the satisfaction of the principle
of equal respect and whether Kevin could self-respectfully accept
such a tax burden. This is where the limitations of Miller‘s account
become clearly visible, because the definition of equal respect that
he uses is completely uninformative on this matter. It seems to me
that Khalid could not self-respectfully accept the bias proposed by
Miller, but how much would foreign aid have to increase for that to
change? And if we found this amount, how could we tell if the tax
burden required is one that Kevin could self-respectfully accept?
Equal Respect Revisited
The uninformative nature of the equal respect principle
stems from the fact that Miller defines it in terms of respect. If we
look again at the two parameters, we notice that they largely
constitute an elucidation of the concept of equal respect. Miller
effectively break it down into two components: respect-towards
and self-respect. Parameters one and two deal with those
respectively. However, the meaning and import of these
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components remains unhappily vague as can be seen in the
discussion at the end of the previous section.
I think current thought in political philosophy can provide
us with more informative concepts of what equal respect entails.
The one I shall focus on here is the recent work in philosophy of
human rights, although Amarty Sen and Martha Nussbaum‘s work
on the human capabilities approach is also a strong candidate.
Human Rights as Equal Respect
International human rights practice is commonly seen as
motivated by the need to protect human dignity in some form or
other. Although this idea of dignity is rather vague, a clear
connection can be seen with the idea of respect. What we mean by
equal respect is that we treat other persons as having a certain
amount of equal intrinsic value. We regard them as worthy of
moral consideration.
Recent works in the philosophy of human rights have
expounded this idea of dignity and tried to give it more substance.
They have established strong philosophical frameworks for
thinking about the goal and content of human rights. The account
given by James Nickel in Making Sense of Human Rights focuses
on vital human interests that human rights are designed to protect.
As such, human rights can be seen as necessary conditions for
living a minimally good life. James Griffin‘s account in On Human
Rights envisions them as protecting a person‘s liberty, autonomy,
and basic standard of living.11 Again, human rights are used to
protect what we see as central to human life.
11
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I think that these accounts can help lend content to the
concept of equal respect. Since human rights are necessary
conditions for a minimally good life, violating them can rightly be
seen as disrespecting the holder of that right. Human rights thus set
a minimum standard for what equal respect for all persons requires:
namely a guarantee not to violate human rights and a strong duty to
help uphold and enforce them whenever one is in a position to do
so at relatively low cost to oneself.
Applying this human rights definition of equal respect to
Miller‘s account yields a very different outcome. For one, the
patriotic bias can no longer be established by only considering the
domestic case. Instead, equal respect demands an effort to
guarantee the observance of human right for all persons both
domestically and abroad.
Certainly I have only sketched an outline here of what such
an approach to the allocation of tax-financed aid would entail.
Further development of the idea of ‗human rights as a standard for
equal respect‘ is necessary in order to work out its exact practical
implications. The duties of different well-off societies to help the
global poor in having their human rights protected need to be
coordinated and a reasonable limit needs to be placed on the
burden that such duties can impose on these societies.
Nevertheless, it appears clear from the outset that any
patriotic bias that claims to show equal respect on my definition of
that term, would be quite different from the one argued for by
Miller. It almost certainly calls for a greater transfer of aid from
the per-capita rich countries to those in need. It does not preclude
the existence of a patriotic bias in tax-financed aid, and in fact
arguments for such a bias are probably justified. It does mean that
13

demands for equal respect will take precedence over any
considerations of patriotic priority, as I have argued they should.
Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that Richard Miller‘s argument
for a patriotic bias rests on an uninformative definition of the
principle of equal respect. Due to the indeterminate nature of this
principle, it is unclear what sort of patriotic bias can be justified.
Whether different allocations of tax-financed aid show equal
respect for all becomes a matter of speculation and personal
interpretations of human psychology.
I have argued that the philosophical human rights tradition
can provide us with a more substantial account of what respect for
persons entails. Recent influential works by James Nickel and
James Griffin suggest human rights as a protection of abilities and
interests necessary for living a minimally good life. Given the
important nature of human rights to individuals persons, I suggest
that equal respect entails the non-violation of these rights as well
as a duty to protect and uphold them when one can do so at little
cost to oneself. I note that this is merely the first step in the
creation of such an account and that more work is needed to
establish clearly the demands ‗human rights as a standard for equal
respect‘ can and ought to give rise to. I do contend that any
account based on this new definition of human rights will fail to
establish a patriotic bias as strong as the one argued for by Richard
Miller.
A last remark with regard to the question of tax-financed
aid is in order. As Charles Beitz has noted, discussions in the field
of global economic justice often make too much of the importance
14

of transfer payments from tax dollars.12 More effective, efficient
and lasting solutions to problems of economic inequality and
global poverty can likely be found through the structural
rearrangement of institutions such that they favor - or at the very
least cease to actively disadvantage - the global poor. For the
purpose of this paper, which was a response to Miller‘s patriotic
bias in tax-financed aid, such questions of institutional reform were
unfortunately not within our scope. Discussions in the field of
global justice and cosmopolitanism can perhaps shine a light on
fruitful solutions in that direction.
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